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ABSTRACT 
TEST is a novel taxonomy of knowledge representations based on three distinct 
hierarchically organized representational features: Tropism, Embodiment, and 
Situatedness. Tropic representational features reflect constraints of the physical world 
on the agent’s ability to form, reactivate, and enrich embodied (i.e., resulting from the 
agent’s bodily constraints) conceptual representations embedded in situated contexts. 
The proposed hierarchy entails that representations can, in principle, have tropic 
features without necessarily having situated and/or embodied features. On the other 
hand, representations that are situated and/or embodied are likely to be simultaneously 
tropic. Hence while we propose tropism as the most general term, the hierarchical 
relationship between embodiment and situatedness is more on a par, such that the 
dominance of one component over the other relies on the distinction between offline 
storage vs. online generation as well as on representation-specific properties. 
135 words. 
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 Introduction 
Classic theories of cognition (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Newell & Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 
2009; Tulving, 1983) regard the human brain as an information processing machine 
operating on mental representations in the form of amodal encapsulated entities 
independent from the perceptions and actions of the agent interacting with the world. 
Such mental representations are essentially abstract symbols translated and divorced 
from sensorimotor experiences of the physical world and the body. As such, symbolic 
theories of knowledge representation postulate a separation between world, body, and 
mind. 
Non-symbolic theories of cognition are significantly different from this classic 
view. They draw the focus away from the mind as a universal Turing Machine with 
the body as its mere input-output interface, towards the view that cognition relies on 
the experiences of the whole organism in its constant interactions with the 
environment. Crucially, according to this view it takes both the body and the world to 
form, integrate, and retrieve knowledge; hence, the corresponding mental 
representations
1
, abstract or concrete, have to be grounded in the interactions between 
the cognizing organism and the environment it inhabits (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; 
Glenberg & Gallese, in press; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). For a representation to be 
grounded, it needs to encode specific parameters of the physical world as well as the 
specific organization of the body. As Barsalou (2010: 717) suggests, a grounded mind 
“…utilizes the environment and the body as external informational structures that 
complement internal representations”. Hence, grounding forms a fundamental 
assumption commonly shared by non-symbolic cognitive theories. 
                                                 
1
 Enactivist and similar approaches to cognition refute the necessity of mental representations as 
primary units of thought by putting emphasis solely on the interaction between the body and the 
environment (e.g., Hutto, 2005; van Elk, Slors, Bekkering, 2010; Varella, Thompson, Rosch, 1991). 
We will continue using the term “mental representations” here in our attempt to hypothesize about their 
diagnostic properties. Our theoretical proposal can in principle replace “representation” with 
“knowledge” without changing its diagnostic hypotheses.. 
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Another notion commonly shared by non-symbolic theories of cognition is 
that of simulation as a driving vehicle of knowledge retrieval. Different views of 
simulation have been proposed. One dominant view defines simulation as “the re-
enactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during experience 
with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2008: 618, see also Gallese, 2005; 
Hesslow, 2012, inter alia). In addition to the retrospective re-enactment of previously 
accumulated experiences, simulation theories emphasize that the simulation process 
makes it possible to predict (e.g., Barsalou, 2009; Clark, in press; Pickering & Garrod, 
2009) and/or emulate (e.g., Colder, 2011; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009) upcoming 
changes in the world including the cognizing organism’s behaviour and the behaviour 
of its conspecifics in the current and similar situations. In other words, simulation 
does not only underlie information retrieval, it also potentiates future actions by 
making predictions from past experiences. The balance between the retrieving and 
predictive aspects of simulation is beyond the scope of this article. Regardless of the 
exact properties of the simulation process, simulated knowledge is essentially 
grounded, multimodal, and integrated within the brain’s sensory and/or motor 
architecture. What is specifically relevant to the goals of our paper is, firstly, the fact 
that all simulation theories feature the world, the body, and the situated context 
among the informational building blocks of the simulated representations. Secondly, 
while simulations are largely based on prior experience with the world—i.e. on 
multimodal information that is stored offline—the process of simulation itself 
happens online, i.e. in the ‘here and now’ of cognitive processing. 
In a similar vein, we do not propose that all concepts are necessarily simulated 
or that all representations require the same amount of simulation. A number of recent 
theoretical proposals emphasize the need for multiple representational systems 
including both embodied and “dis-embodied” (i.e., abstract) concepts (e.g., Barsalou, 
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2008; Dove, 2011; Gilead, et al., 2012; Louwerse & Connell, 2010; Markman & 
Brendl, 2005; Wilson, 2002). The question of what abstraction is with regard to 
simulation is very important; here however, we simply follow the working hypothesis 
that the required degree of simulation can be viewed as inversely related to the 
required degree of abstraction: A more automated and engrained representation 
requires less and/or more shallow simulation for adequate retrieval, thereby implying 
higher degrees of abstraction (e.g., Chatterjee, 2010; Johnson, 2007, Tucker, 2001). 
So, what body/world parameters are known to be simulated during knowledge 
retrieval? In addition to well-documented simulation of the organism’s embodied 
experiences (the body), two further components include “tropism”, i.e. the objective 
organization of the physical world (see further below) and “situatedness”, i.e. the 
given context in which the knowledge is retrieved. The latter is different from the 
world per se in two ways. First, contexts are not “objective”, they form the subset of 
the environment perceived as relevant to the agent’s goals and actions. Second, 
relevant contexts may be physical, social, introspective, etc. 
The dynamic relationship between these three components (tropic, embodied, 
situated) is the focus of our paper. In the remaining paragraphs we discuss the 
proposed relational taxonomy with regard to three different functional aspects of 
simulated representations: (1) the individual diagnostic features of the world-specific, 
the body-specific, and context-specific components, (2) the hierarchical relationship 
between them, and (3) their specific instantiations in relation to the distinction 
between online (e.g. simulated) and offline (stored) representations (e.g. Wilson, 
2002). We believe it is essential to make and explain these distinctions in order to 
resolve some of the present confusion in the literature, where labels such as 
“grounded”, “embodied”, or “situated” processing have often been ill-distinguished or 
used interchangeably, making concrete and falsifiable predictions impossible. 
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TEST: A theory of Tropic, Embodied, and Situated Cognition. 
Cognitive Tropism 
Our attempt to explain how the world, the body, and the context interact as 
components of multimodal representations starts with a perplexing observation: There 
is no good term for the specific effects of the world on mental representations. 
Previous work by Kessler & Rutherford (2010), Myachykov, Platenburg & Fischer 
(2009), and Pezzulo et al. (2011) advanced the idea that the special role of world-
related simulation can be referred to as a form of grounding, meaning that it reflects 
features and constraints of the physical world in which the representations were 
acquired and in which they become continuously reactivated. However, as we have 
already noted, grounding also (and more conventionally) refers to modal or 
multimodal ways of representing abstract knowledge and not necessarily knowledge 
about the world. As we will show, effects of the physical world on mental 
representations can be quite specific; hence, we decided to borrow the concept of 
tropism from another scientific discipline, i.e., plant biology. 
It is commonly known that the forms and shapes of plants are a result of 
environment-driven adaptation processes. Interestingly, plants’ behaviour also reflects 
the organization of the surrounding environment. This phenomenon, known as 
tropism, refers to the plant’s specific response (e.g., direction of growth) as a result of 
changes in environmental stimuli, such as, light, gravity, temperature, 
presence/absence of water (Garzon & Keijzer, 2011; Karban, 2008; Kiss, 2006; Poff, 
et al., 1994). Specific types of tropism include gravitropism (movement or growth in 
response to gravity), heliotropism (movement or growth in response to solar activity), 
phototropism (movement or growth in response to light or colour). 
In analogous fashion, we propose a hierarchy with representational tropism as 
the most general, stable, and automated component within multimodal 
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representations, while embodiment and situatedness are more specific notions. This 
proposal results in a hierarchical system of Tropic, Embodied, and Situated Theory of 
Cognition (TEST). Table 1 provides a very basic and minimal summary of specific 
representational components, their associated domains, and stability parameters. 
 
=====insert Table 1 about here===== 
 
Tropic representations are the most stable representations, because they reflect 
aspects of the environment that are stable. This notion of stability refers to invariant 
features of the environment, the body, and situational context that can be extracted 
and consolidated into long-term memory across time and repeated occurrences. In the 
most general terms, our proposal suggests that these three different forms of 
experiential cognition are associated with different degrees of stability which makes 
them more or less malleable to training and retraining. Although the proposed 
taxonomy puts tropism at the top of the hierarchy, the other two components are more 
equally weighted. For offline (stored) representations we argue that embodied 
representations are moderately stable because they are sensitive to individual 
differences in long-term sensory-motor experience (e.g. handedness, blindness, 
deafness), while situated representations are less stable because they reflect aspects of 
the current context in which an agent is interacting (e.g. task-specific variations). 
For online processing (which typically involves simulation) we will also argue 
that, due to their primacy and stability, tropic concepts require little depth of 
simulation, are not easily retrained, and are largely due to environmental regularities. 
In contrast, offline embodied representations are largely due to bodily regularities. 
They would remain more open to retraining and would require more depth of online 
simulation for retrieval. Finally, situated representations rely more on momentary 
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context of the environment and/or the agent; like embodied representations, they 
would also be more easily retrained and would require deeper online simulation. Note 
that for online processing the agent’s body provides a particular aspect of the wider 
situational context that can be recruited for representation or not. Hence, the hierarchy 
between embodied and situated processing may depend on whether one focuses on 
stored representations or on online processing as will be further elaborated in the next 
section. 
Similar to tropism in plant biology, tropic components of knowledge may 
reflect world features such as gravity, sun-related cardinal orientation, and vertical 
accumulation of objects and quantities. The fact that humans share “the same world” 
leads to the primacy of the tropic representational component, as well as its ubiquitous 
presence in many stored and simulated representations. To be clear, this does not 
imply that every multimodal representation must be tropic. It does, however, imply 
that, when present, the tropic component is the same regardless of other, variable, 
simulation constraints (such as individual bodily difference, language, or social 
context). One example of universal tropism is the tendency to represent increasing 
numerosities along the upward oriented vertical spatial axis—‘more’ means ‘piling 
up’ in a direction opposite to the effect of gravity. 
We further suggest that statistical invariances of tropism across a variety of 
occurrences often become part of a representation’s core (e.g. “down” always points 
in the direction of gravity), while the unique tropism of a particular cognitive instance 
can influence the instantiation of a representation online in a particular situation (e.g. 
“down” would become more visually defined during parabolic flight, when gravity is 
removed, e.g. Dalecki et al., 2012). 
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Situatedness and embodiment 
Further to representational tropism, conceptual representations can be embodied if 
they encode the agent’s bodily state during the acquisition, generation, and 
comprehension of conceptual knowledge. In this respect, embodied properties code 
both the bodily features shared with other conspecific organisms as well as features 
specific to an individual organism. The distinction between offline and online 
modalities (Wilson, 2002) becomes essential in this context: Motor programs 
common to all occurrences of a concept become part of the long-term core 
representation. We propose that embodied components become the core of offline 
representations whose parameters were shaped by the general constraints of the 
human body (e.g. opposable thumbs or frontal vision). For example, humans use a 
number of different simulation frames in order to conceptualize time, one of which is 
along an egocentric forward-oriented axis, congruent with moving forward through 
physical space. Hence, idiosyncratic corporeal arrangements (e.g. being born without 
arms) should shape the individual’s particular representational features in relation to 
the affordances within the world. 
Congruent with our notion of tropism, simulated representations can often be 
embedded within (and constrained by) a situational context; that is the agent’s specific 
interpretation of the environment with regard to his or her goals. Hence, conceptual 
representations are situated because they reflect the specific contexts, within which 
they are formed and used. Common situated features can be extracted as invariants 
and also become core parts of offline representations (e.g., left-to-right reading 
direction or social conventions in general, e.g. polite speech). In some cases, these 
situated features are less fundamental than the tropic constraints or, as we will discuss 
below, the constraints imposed by the body. In other cases, situated parameters may 
dominate over embodied ones when the role of bodily states is a “weaker” contributor 
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than the context during a particular online simulation. For example, one might be 
more inclined to adopt the child’s spatial perspective when interacting with a child 
independent of current bodily constraints. Hence, in the online modality, embodied 
simulation can be quite specific as it involves the most specific representational 
features. In other words, bodily experiences need to be an essential part of a 
simulation process to fulfil the definition of online embodiment beyond existing 
physical and contextual constraints.  
There are a couple of important features related to the specific hierarchical 
relationship between tropic, embodied, and situated features in a given representation. 
First, the proposed relational hierarchy entails that representations can, in principle, be 
tropic without being situated and/or embodied. On the other hand, representations that 
are situated and/or embodied are likely to have tropic features as well (since situations 
and bodies are part of the environment). Hence, while we propose tropism as the most 
general term, the hierarchical relationship between embodiment and situatedness is 
more on a par, such that the dominance of one component over the other relies on the 
distinction between offline and online generation as well as on representation-specific 
properties. Second, our theory assumes that the distinction between the three proposed 
components is categorical: While a specific simulated representation can, in principle, 
contain any combination of the three components (for instance, a given representation 
may be regarded as both tropic and embodied), we initially do not propose a “graded” 
distinction whereby the three components are just “short-hands” for different levels of 
representational stability along a continuum. In our view, a categorical distinction is 
better suited to generating falsifiable hypotheses, by specifying both quantitative and 
qualitative diagnostics for each individual component. 
Therefore, our proposal makes a step towards unifying theories of simulated 
cognition by deriving diagnostic features from the proposed relationships between 
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tropism, embodiment and situatedness. Prominently, these include the following 
dimensions: (1) the requirements for, and the “depth” of the involved cognitive 
simulations, (2) the steepness of learning and re-training gradients of specific features 
in offline representations, and (3) the degree to which a particular conceptual 
representation depends on the online constraints provided by the mental 
representations of the world, the body, and/or the situational context. These diagnostic 
features lead to concrete hypotheses that we will outline below. 
In the paragraphs that follow, we provide examples of tropic, situated, and 
embodied knowledge representations in three areas of cognitive research: Abstract 
language, understanding numerosities, and perspective taking in communication. We 
will use the domain of abstract language in order to demonstrate the presence of 
individual and distinct diagnostic representational features that reflect tropic, 
embodied, and situated components. We will then discuss recent evidence from 
numerical cognition in an attempt to demonstrate how the proposed (offline) 
hierarchy of (stable) tropism, (less stable) embodiment, and (dynamic) situatedness is 
reflected in the relative ease of their re-training. Finally, in order to highlight the 
importance of online versus offline properties of simulated representations, we will 
bring forward examples from research on perspective taking. We will conclude with 
suggestions for further research. 
 
Abstract language: A case for the specific diagnostic features of TEST components 
Human language and linguistic behaviour provide arguably the most diverse testing 
grounds for multimodal and simulation-based theories of cognition. In part, this is a 
result of the ability of lexical concepts to carry both concrete and abstract meaning. 
Recent behavioural (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) and 
neuroscientific (e.g. Cacciari, et al., 2011; Hauk et al., 2004) studies convincingly 
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demonstrate that in comprehension, words denoting concrete concepts activate 
distributed networks that include activation of sensorimotor components. More 
importantly, the same principle of representing language via modal systems holds true 
for abstract concepts (e.g., Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Cacciari, et al., 2011; 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg, et al., 2008) and even for some basic grammatical 
units of a language (e.g., Fazio, et al., 2009; Guerra-Filho & Aloimonos, 2012; 
Kemmerer, 2012; Pulverműller & Fadiga, 2010). Here we will use a couple of 
examples from language research showing how the proposed hierarchical taxonomy 
can be applied to abstract language. 
Multidimensional mappings between abstract language about emotional 
valence (e.g., good vs. bad) and space are good examples of the relationship between 
tropic and embodied components in abstract language. Speakers of different 
languages consistently map vertical space onto the contrast between positive and 
negative abstract words denoting affect (e.g., good is up, bad is down). This tropic 
spatial mapping emerges from the collection of constantly performed motor functions 
resulting from our erect posture within the gravitational field we live in (Ortiz, 2011). 
Confirming this, Meier and Robinson (2004) demonstrated that a word presented at 
the top of the screen is recognized faster when it denotes a positive concept while 
negative-connotation words are categorized faster when presented in the bottom of the 
screen (see Crawford, 2009; Meier, et al., in press, for reviews of similar studies). A 
recent meta-analysis by Lakens (2012) suggests that this consistent mapping can be 
explained by polarity differences between the corresponding dimensions in the 
physical and emotional domains
2
. 
                                                 
2
 It has to be noted that in Lakens’s own data no consistent mapping from bad concepts to low space 
was found while good concepts were indeed processed faster in higher space compared to lower space. 
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At the same time, representing emotional words reveals an embodied mapping 
along horizontal space: Right-handers tend to associate good with right space and bad 
with left space (Casasanto, 2011, for a recent review). A recent study (Brookshire & 
Casasanto, 2011) showed that the processing of emotional words is also linked to the 
lateralized cortical representation of manual motor actions. Although the evidence 
from linguistic universals along the horizontal dimension is lacking, the proposed 
hierarchical dominance of tropism over embodiment would predict that embodied 
metaphorical mapping of emotional words onto horizontal space should be easier to 
un-train (or re-train) than the corresponding tropic vertical mapping component. 
The multidimensional spatial mapping of emotional words also provides a 
window into the difference between shared (core) and individual-specific variants of 
the same representation. For example, one core element of the embodied horizontal-
space mapping is associated with a culturally unspecific right-hand dominance in 
most speakers. This representational core reveals itself in the cross-linguistic 
prevalence of metaphors that consistently associate right with good (e.g., right-hand 
man) and left with bad (e.g., “hodit’ nalevo” (go left) in Russian means to commit 
adultery). At the same time, an individual’s handedness may modulate the 
directionality of the mapping: Left-handers demonstrate lateral representation of 
abstract emotional valence opposite to right-handers (Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto & 
Chrysikou, 2001). The latter is important as it suggests that, in contrast with 
numerosities (see following section), simulated representations of emotional words do 
not have a strong situated component that would similarly reflect situated contexts, 
such as reading direction. The recent discovery of the QWERTY effect (Jasmin & 
Casasanto, 2012) confirms that horizontal rightward mapping of affect reflects the 
prevalence of right- over left-hand dominant people rather than the organization of 
specific scripts. 
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Furthermore, although the vertically oriented tropic mapping of emotional 
words is shared by humans, it is subject to individual embodied tuning. For example, 
people with stronger embodied representations of affect also reveal a stronger 
association between affect and space (Moeller, Robinson, & Zabelina, 2008). 
Similarly, neurotic and depressed individuals reveal stronger lower/negative 
signatures of the vertical mapping of affect-related language (Meier & Robinson, 
2006). Finally, individual differences in covert spatial attention predict the strength of 
the vertical mapping by modulating the speed with which participants react to 
vertically positioned probe words (Robinson et al., 2008). 
An even more complex multidimensional spatial mapping is found in the 
linguistic concepts denoting time (Boroditsky, 2011, for a review). Words related to 
time perception appear to cluster within a three-dimensional space including (1) the 
embodied egocentric back-to-front perspective of the body’s movement through 
space, (2) situated horizontal and vertical projections from the culturally specific 
organization of text, and (3) tropic projections of the geographical organization of the 
world, such as progression of the Sun from east to west. 
The ubiquitous embodied component in our representations of time relates to 
the universal egocentric perspective of “moving” through time similarly to moving in 
space, with the future being ahead and the past being behind (Boroditsky, 2000). 
Because of the comparable bodily arrangement across speakers of different languages, 
this component constitutes the core of simulated representation of time in speakers of 
all human languages. At the same time, culturally specific contexts, such as reading 
habits, lead to the establishment of a distinct situated component in the simulated 
representation of time. Confirming this, Boroditsky (2001), Boroditsky, Fuhrman, & 
McCormick (2011), and Fuhrman & Boroditsky (2010) showed that the time 
perception of English, Mandarin, and Hebrew speakers differs in how speakers of 
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these languages map the concept of time onto vertical and horizontal spatial 
arrangements, consistent with the direction of reading and writing. For example, 
Hebrew speakers reveal horizontal right-to-left mapping of time reversed from the 
one common in English speakers who represent time as progressing from left to right 
(cf. Fischer, Shaki, & Cruise, 2009, for a similar effect with number representation). 
Mandarin speakers, on the other hand, show a pattern not present in either English or 
Hebrew: Due to the vertical script arrangement they tend to think about time as 
progressing vertically downwards (see also Bergen & Lau, 2012 for similar findings 
on how writing direction maps onto time). Together with our discussion of similar 
effects in number processing (see below), these findings provide converging evidence 
for culturally specific situated features in representations that originate from different 
abstract knowledge domains. Consistent with predictions derived from our 
hierarchical view of tropism, situatedness, and embodiment, the shared embodied 
mapping of egocentric perception of time with future ahead and past behind should be 
harder to unlearn than the culturally assumed mapping along horizontal and/or 
vertical space resulting from culturally specific reading experiences. 
It appears that the embodied core of the time concept is relatively immune to 
simultaneously representing any tropic features. Perhaps this is not too surprising 
given that time cannot be physically experienced as such. However, a recent report by 
Boroditsky and Gaby (2010) may point to some exceptions: Speakers of 
Pormpuraawan, an Australian Aboriginal language, were shown to represent time as 
progressing from east (past) to west (future), independent of viewpoint. This finding 
supports our notion of tropism by demonstrating how mental representations of time 
can encode the nature of the physical world independently of embodied or situated 
dimensions. Interestingly, a brief informal analysis of the etymology of the English 
word West shows that in the Early English period it also meant evening, the latter 
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suggesting a tropic component in the concept of time. Supposedly, this tropic 
component became less relevant as the importance of organizing every-day life 
around sun cycles diminished for speakers of English. This hypothesis opens 
interesting possibilities for investigating similar properties in other languages. At the 
same time, the discussed examples demonstrate that tropic representations are not 
necessarily universal as there is cross-cultural variation as to how language is mapped 
onto experiences with the world. 
It is also interesting to consider how different spatial axes can be related to 
specific bodily features. The typical human body has a clearly defined front (face), 
back (spine), top (head), and bottom (feet), while the left and right sides are visually 
quite symmetrical in terms of anatomic features. In terms of mappings of abstract 
concepts onto embodied spatial representations, these considerations lead to the 
general prediction that mappings in relation to axes with well-defined bodily 
asymmetries (i.e. vertical and front/back axes for concepts of valence and time) will 
result in the extraction of these asymmetries as permanently stored embodied 
representations. The corresponding mappings should be harder to re-train than 
mappings related to left-right space for which the human body is visually symmetrical 
and can, thus, only rely on “introspective” action-related asymmetries based on 
handedness. These considerations will play a prominent role in the next sections, 
particularly in the section on perspective taking and will be elaborated in relation to 
our online/offline distinction. 
 
Numerical cognition: A case for the hierarchy and depth of processing 
The field of numerical cognition is characterized by a large range of well-known 
performance signatures that indicate a complex interplay between perceptual, 
syntactic, semantic and strategic factors. For example, the size congruity effect (Henik 
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& Tzelgov, 1982) denotes a competition between the physical size and the magnitude 
meaning of visually presented numerical symbols, and the inversion effect (Brysbaert 
et al., 1998) describes a culture-specific directional conflict between linguistic and 
perceptual representations of multi-digit numbers (for a recent review see Nuerk et al., 
2011). 
Of special interest for the present debate is the SNARC (spatial-numerical 
association of response codes) effect, which indicates a pervasive association between 
numbers and space (for recent review see Wood et al., 2008). Indeed, as will be 
shown, the SNARC effect can serve as a test-bed for the hierarchical view of tropic, 
embodied, and situated representations of number magnitude, particularly from the 
point of view of the representational feature’s stability. As stated earlier, we assume 
that tropic representations are the most stable because they reflect the most consistent 
learning experience, whereas embodied representations are less stable as they capture 
individual-specific sensorimotor experiences that reflect sensory-motor contingencies 
and the contextualized use of number magnitudes. Finally, situated number concepts 
are associated with space in the most flexible way because their availability is driven 
by online task demands. This proposed hierarchy makes it clear that our theory must 
consider both the diagnostic power and the relative depth of processing when 
discussing tropic, embodied, and situated representational properties. 
Consider first the ubiquitous association between magnitudes and vertical 
space: Small numbers (1, 2) are usually associated with lower space and higher 
numbers (8, 9) with upper space. This association was experimentally documented for 
manual button presses (Ito & Hatta, 2004) as well as saccadic eye movements 
(Schwarz & Keus, 2004), and generalizes even to auditory frequencies (Rusconi et al., 
2005; Fischer et al., in press). The vertical SNARC reflects the regular increase in 
height for larger accumulations of objects. It holds across cultures, as is indicated also 
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by its universal metaphorical expression in language (e.g., “higher value”, “lower 
score”; see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). As such, the vertical SNARC is present in 
offline as well as online knowledge representations. It is present even in participants 
who do not associate number magnitudes with horizontal space, e.g., due to 
conflicting reading habits for texts and numbers (Shaki & Fischer, 2012). Apparent 
counter-examples, such as league tables or negative temperature scales, reflect 
situation-specific exceptions that can be subsumed under this principle when 
considering the linguistic markedness of the respective concepts (less good, less 
warm). 
A diagnostic feature of tropic number representations is their resistance to 
remapping. This was documented in a recent series of training studies which 
measured the vertical SNARC before, during and after a number entry task (for 
details, see Fischer, 2012). Specifically, healthy adults were first classified into two 
groups according to their pre-experimental vertical SNARC. Those who showed the 
tropic association (the majority) were required to enter digits on a numerical keypad 
with the telephone mapping (small numbers above large numbers), while those few 
participants who showed the reverse pre-experimental association (perhaps due to 
recent telephone use) had to enter digits on a numerical keyboard that exhibits the 
tropic mapping (small numbers below large numbers); in other words, both groups 
had to unlearn their initial SNARC. Consistent with predictions derived from our 
hierarchical view of tropism, embodiment and situatedness, the tropic mapping was 
harder to unlearn than the reverse mapping. 
Now consider embodied representations of number magnitude. These should 
be sensitive to an individual’s learning history and, in particular, to their sensory-
motor experiences with number magnitudes. Finger counting is a good example of 
embodied numerical cognition. Most people acquire number concepts through finger 
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counting in childhood, and there are systematic culture-specific preferences for 
starting to count on either the left or right hand (Lindemann et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, these counting habits influence numerical cognition even in adulthood 
(for review, see Fischer & Brugger, 2011). For example, passive viewing of small 
numbers activates the right-hand motor cortex in those adults who prefer to start 
counting on their left hand (Tschentscher et al., 2012). The SNARC effect is also 
modulated by starting hand (Fischer, 2008) and adults’ number comparison speed 
depends on whether the numbers are signalled with one or two hands (Domahs et al., 
2010). 
The embodied level of (offline) knowledge representation is where individual 
differences might come into play, from either one’s sensory impairments (e.g., 
blindness, deafness, or deafferentation) or one’s motoric constraints (e.g., extreme 
height, weight, or arthritis) or both (e.g., an amputation or neuropathy). For a recent 
review of individual differences in embodied cognition, see Casasanto (2011) or 
Fischer & Keehner (2012). 
Finally, consider the situated spatial representation of numbers. This level of 
knowledge representation (or accessibility) is characterized by extremely flexible 
performance biases that indicate rapid changes in spatial-numerical mappings. One 
such example is the effect of head orientation on the average magnitude of randomly 
generated numbers (Lötscher et al., 2008): When turning their head to the left, adults 
generate more small numbers, and when turning their head to the right they generate 
more large numbers. However, in speakers of Hebrew, this typical left-right 
association (small numbers on the left and larger numbers on the right) is eliminated 
immediately after a single Hebrew word (read from right to left) is presented (see 
Fischer et al., 2009). Results such as these predict an extremely steep learning curve 
for situated representations in remapping experiments. Embodied representations 
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should require longer training, and tropic representations the longest—the latter two 
are associated with increasingly stable representations of numerosity.  
 
Perspective taking: A case for the offline-online distinction 
Non-symbolic theories of cognition have been motivated in part by the observation 
that humans (and other species) use their own body repertoire to implicitly simulate 
what they perceive in others (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 
1992; Gallese, 2007). Recently, Kessler and Thomson (2010) showed that adopting 
someone else’s visuo-spatial perspective consciously and deliberately requires an 
embodied mental simulation, suggesting a connection between implicit (automatic) 
self-other mappings (Kessler & Miellet, in press; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; Reed & 
Farah, 1995) and conscious representations of others’ mental states (Hamilton, 
Brindley, & Frith, 2009; Surtees, Noordzij, & Apperly, 2012). However, different 
forms or levels of visuo-spatial perspective taking differ with respect to the online vs. 
offline contributions of embodied and situated features (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010). 
Developmental and comparative psychologists have suggested two levels of 
perspective taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Moll & Tomasello, 2006; 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Level-1 perspective taking (PT) 
involves, for example, tracking whether or not an object is visible to another 
perceiver. Kessler and Rutherford (2010) showed that such a judgment is equivalent 
to verbally determining whether a target is “in front of” or “behind” an occluding 
object from another perspective (Fig. 1). By contrast, Level-2 PT involves 
understanding how the visual world appears to another perceiver (Flavell et al., 1981). 
Imagine telling a friend that she has an eyelash on her left cheek. This requires 
determining “left” and “right” from your friend’s perspective independently of your 
own viewpoint (see Figure 1). 
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======insert Figure 1 about here====== 
 
Both forms of PT result in cognitive representations of other people’s views of 
the world that are strongly determined by the context of the specific situation and can 
be related to specific features of the human perceptual apparatus and body (Kessler & 
Rutherford, 2010). However, the body’s involvement in achieving each 
representational level online essentially differs. It was shown that only Level-2 PT 
involves an embodied transformation by means of a simulated rotation of the 
observer’s body schema (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Kessler & Thomson, 2010; see 
Fig. 1). Level-1 PT is determined differently – in relation to the line of sight of the 
other person (cf. Michelon & Zacks, 2006) without a simulated body rotation (Fig. 1). 
In agreement with Grabowski (1999), Kessler & Rutherford (2010) concluded that “in 
front”/”behind” relate to asymmetries of the human body, where the eyes and the face 
define the front, while “left”/”right” relate to its symmetrical sides. As a consequence, 
the front of the egocentric perspective or any other perspective can be easily 
determined. This is also the case for objects, where the canonical use can define an 
intrinsic front and back (e.g. cars, Grabowski, 1999; Levelt, 1996). A perceptible front 
automatically implies a line-of-sight and the “in front of” direction, while “behind” 
can be directly derived as the opposite pole. According to our representational 
hierarchy, the stored offline concepts of “in front” and ”behind” therefore contain 
embodied elements that relate to specific body features independent of a specific 
situational context. 
Crucially, however, the (typical) human body is visually symmetrical in the 
left/right dimension. Thus, no features are available for extracting and storing offline 
embodied representations for “left” and. “right” – this would be different if humans 
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only possessed one lateralized arm for instance. For remembering the egocentric left 
and right, various online strategies are possible and a few might involve mental 
simulation of handedness (e.g. “The hand I use for writing is on the “right” side of my 
body”). Due to the lack of visually distinguishable features, another’s left or right 
must be determined by projecting the egocentric left/right onto their body and 
perspective (Kessler & Wang, 2012). This requires an online simulation of a body 
rotation that is realistic and deeply embodied but specific to a given situation: The 
amount and direction of simulated body rotation depends on the spatial orientation of 
the observer in relation to the target perspective (Fig. 1). Thus, embodiment only 
plays a role online when movement simulation is engaged. 
A clear dissociation between the two levels of perspective taking (and 
associated linguistic expressions) reveals a relational distinction between situated and 
embodied representational elements. The long-term representations of “in front” and 
”behind” contain offline embodied elements (e.g. gaze, line-of-sight). This also 
implies that the online representations (and the associated line-of-sight) do not 
necessitate such a realistic simulation process as the one observed for “left” versus 
“right”. However, decoding another person’s gaze could be regarded as a form of 
online embodiment in its own right, given that processes of implicit motor resonance 
have indeed been reported for gaze perception (for a review Frischen, Bayliss, & 
Tipper, 2007; Grosbras, Laird, & Paus, 2005; Wallentin, Roepstorff, & Burgess, 
2008). Nevertheless, such a form of online embodiment is assumed to be more 
implicit than an explicit embodied simulation. By contrast, “left” versus “right” are 
embodied in form of online simulated body schema rotations; their long-term (offline) 
representations are proposed to merely ‘point’ to the generic neural algorithms that 
achieve a situated representation by embodied means (i.e. a simulated body rotation). 
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The diagnostic features proposed in the current paper suggest three main 
conclusions. First, the mental body schema rotation during Level-2 PT for 
determining “left” versus “right” entails a more elaborate online simulation process 
than Level-1 PT associated with “in front” versus “behind”. Second, for “left” versus 
“right”, one can predict activation in body-related brain areas that should also reflect 
the required amount of body schema transformation (i.e. angular disparity). 
Supporting evidence is indeed accumulating (e.g. Lambrey, Doeller, Berthoz, & 
Burgess, 2012; Wraga, Shephard, Church, Inati, & Kosslyn, 2005; Zacks & Michelon, 
2005). Third, the dimensional polarities of “left” versus “right” should be easier to 
reverse through re-training than “in front” versus “behind”. While the latter is still an 
open empirical question, error data showing increased confusion with “left” versus 
“right” compared to “in front” versus “behind” provide some supporting evidence 
(Kessler & Rutherford, 2010).  
As mentioned before, the body asymmetries that lead to different embodied 
and situated properties for left/right vs. in-front/behind along the online/offline 
distinction, including predictions about efforts for retraining can be generalised to 
other concepts that are mapped on the different body axes. Concepts of valence and 
time that are related to the font-back axes (and even more so to the body- and gravity-
based top-bottom axes) would be harder to re-train and would require less online 
simulation than concepts related to the more symmetrical left-right axes that could 
only rely on the weaker handedness feature for long-term representations.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a novel ontological framework, called TEST, 
which suggests independent diagnostics for the presence of tropic, situated, and 
embodied features of simulated modal representations. Our approach is particularly 
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novel by emphasising the interaction between embodied, situated, and tropic aspects 
for online as well as offline representations. The latter highlights the importance of 
the learning history for determining how online tropic, situated and embodied aspects 
of the world transpire into the offline core of representations. We also discussed a 
number of examples of experimental effects corresponding to the distinct tropic, 
embodied, and situated features of simulated representations from the research on 
abstract language, number processing, and perspective taking. 
Overall, our proposal makes a step towards unifying embodied theories of 
cognition by deriving diagnostic features from the proposed relationships between 
world-, body-, and context-related effects. Prominently, these include (a) the 
requirements for, and the “realism” or “depth” of, the involved cognitive simulations; 
(b) the steepness of learning and re-training gradients of specific features in long-term 
representations; and (c) the degree to which a particular conceptual representation 
depends on the online constraints provided by the mental representations of the body, 
the situation, and the outside world. These diagnostic features lead to concrete 
hypotheses, e.g., regarding the situated and/or embodied reversal of long-term effects 
(e.g. for valence). We conclude that it is beneficial to distinguish between 
representational constraints imposed by the physical world, the body, and the 
situational context. This certainly allows for more specific predictions than the 
conjecture that bodies, situational contexts, and the world are all related somehow. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Representational components within the TEST theory. 
 
Component Domain Stability 
Tropic Physical world Stable 
Embodied Body Moderately stable 
Situated Context Less stable 
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Figure 1: Left shows examples of “in front of”, requiring Level-1 perspective taking 
(L1PT in the results graph) and of “to the right of”, requiring Level-2 perspective 
taking (L2PT). The stimuli in Kessler and Rutherford (2010) employed the same table 
and avatar as shown here, but slightly different targets (coloured hemispheres). 
Middle shows the two possible body posture that participants were instructed to adopt 
before each trial in Kessler and Rutherford (2010; also in Kessler & Thomson, 2010). 
The postures could be either congruent or incongruent with the direction in which the 
avatar was positioned. Here, the left posture is turned towards the avatar shown in the 
left picture, giving an example for the “congruent” condition, while the right posture 
is turned away, giving an example for the “incongruent” condition. Right shows a 
result graph for response times in ms (cf. Kessler & Rutherford, 2010). L2PT 
(“left”/”right”) was significantly affected by angular disparity and posture congruence 
(congruent faster than incongruent, particularly at 110 and 160 deg disparity). No 
effects were observed for L1PT (“in front”/”behind”). 
